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1. Introduction
In our original paper [1], we presented the Secure Remote Update Protocol (SRUP), a Command
and Control (C2) protocol for Internet of Things devices, and focused on how the protocol can be used
to implement a robust and secure software update. In this paper, we introduce additional message
types to expand the functionality of the protocol and, in particular, address the challenging problem of
the identity of devices.
Section 3 introduces enhancements to the originally published protocol to address some identified
short-comings. Section 4 identifies the challenges of, and a proposed solution for, initial key exchange
within an Internet of Things (IoT) system. Section 5 looks at proof of identity in the context of the IoT
and SRUP. Section 6 looks at the challenges of key revocation, and Section 7 describes some potential
attacks against the system and mitigations against these. Section 8 describes a technique for making
human recognition of cryptographic identities more straightforward. Finally, Section 9 describes
testing of the initial implementation of the protocol and planned future experimentation.
2. Background
With the proliferation of IoT devices seen over the last few years, such devices have been the
targets of those wishing to create networks of slave devices (so-called botnets, such as the one created by
the Mirai malware [2]), with which to stage Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks
typically exploit serious security vulnerabilities in the design of many IoT devices, such as hard-coded
passwords, lack of security updates to the device software and insecure network configuration (such
as providing remote network terminal interfaces) [3]. The key motivation behind SRUP was to provide
a secure and trustworthy mechanism for remote C2 operations on IoT devices; whilst reducing the
attack surface to the minimum.
The Secure Remote Update Protocol has been designed to exploit extant commodity open-source
software and open standards. It takes advantage of existing and commonly-used protocols and
techniques for Internet communications, but combines them in a unique and novel way to provide
an integrated protocol to conduct C2 operations for IoT devices, autonomous systems and other
related platforms.
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There are a number of communications architectures used to facilitate communications with IoT
devices; one of the most commonly used is the publish/subscribe paradigm. Within IoT devices, perhaps
the most commonly-used publish/subscribe protocol is Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT).
MQTT is a lightweight brokered publish/subscribe protocol, originally developed by Andy
Stanford-Clark (IBM) and Arlen Nipper (Arcom) in 1999 to provide lightweight telemetry for the oil
and gas industry. It became an Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS) standard in 2013 [4]. All messages sent are routed via a broker; the broker is responsible for
tracking all subscriptions and sending data to subscribers when a publisher issues a message. MQTT
runs over Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) networks, using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [5] as
the transport layer.
MQTT supports multiple Quality of Service (QoS) settings. For the minimum overhead, QoS 0
(defined by the MQTT standard [4] as “at most once” delivery) can be used, which provides no
guarantee of delivery. However, for many IoT applications, especially those deployed in locations with
austere or otherwise fragile Internet connectivity, QoS 1 (“at least once” delivery) provides an excellent
way to ensure that C2 messages are sent/received, at the cost of a slightly higher data overhead.
QoS 1 requires the MQTT to acknowledge all received messages, using a Publish Acknowledge
(PUBACK) message. MQTT also supports QoS 2 (“exactly once” delivery), albeit at the cost of
requiring a three-part message exchange within MQTT. Given the nature of the SRUP messages and
the enhancements introduced in Section 3, this level of assurance is not required. Both QoS 1 and 2 are
implemented at the MQTT level and carried out automatically by the MQTT client; so that different
QoS may be implemented in different situations without needing to make any changes at the SRUP
level.
MQTT is by default an insecure protocol (all data are sent as plain text), but it can be secured with
the application of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6] to the traffic.
There are a number of open-source brokers; this research has been carried out using the Mosquitto
broker. Mosquitto implements the MQTT protocol Versions 3.1 and 3.1.1 [7].
MQTT is a very widely-supported protocol within the IoT. MQTT libraries exist for many common
development platforms (including Arduino and mbed); and it is supported by the vast majority of
programming languages. There is also a large number of clients available, both command-line tools
and GUI applications. There are a number of clients available for mobile devices, as well, including
clients for both iOS and Android. MQTT is also the protocol used by Amazon Web Services (AWS) for
their IoT platform.
SRUP is built on top of MQTT and provides an efficient binary message structure contained within
the payload of an MQTT message. SRUP has been designed as a messaging protocol for C2 messages
for the IoT that assures both authentication of the origin of a message and integrity of the content.
3. Enhancements and Improvements to the Original Protocol
3.1. Vulnerability to Replay Attack
The initially specified version of the SRUP protocol provides a good degree of security against
a malicious party changing or spoofing the C2 messages that are being sent to the device. By using
cryptographic signatures, applied over all of the data contained within the SRUP message, any part of
the data that is altered will cause the signature to fail to validate against the content of the message.
In the context of software update, further assurance is provided by including the output from a secure
hashing function (SHA-256), to validate the integrity of the file to be retrieved.
There is, however, a potential vulnerability that remains in the implementation: namely potential
susceptibility to “replay attack”. A replay attack is one where a malicious party captures a message
and re-transmits it at a future time in order to make the receiving device perform the previous
operation again. In the case of the initial implementation of SRUP (which only implemented the
update message-set), there is a relatively low risk associated with this: the attacker would only be
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able to make the device download a valid update. However, with patience, after capturing an initial
update message and after detecting a second update, it would in theory be possible to roll the device
back to a previous version. It may also be possible to use this mechanism to stage a denial-of-service
attack against a specific device by constantly sending it messages forcing it to apply the same update
(and potentially taking it off-line whilst it did so). Clearly, as the protocol grows to add different classes
of message, the potential damage of a message being replayed to a device is much higher.
3.1.1. Common Mitigations to Replay Attack
A common solution to replay attacks is to introduce an additional one-time nonce element
within the communication (for example, as used within Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) ‘Basic’
authentication [8,9]), such that a reply to one message will not be valid when sent in conjunction with
another. However due to the model of minimal interaction that is used by SRUP, this approach will not
work without at least two more messages being exchanged. For example, after the existing initialized
message (sent to the device with the server’s session token), the device would need to send an initial
response message (containing the session token and a unique device token), and the server would then
respond with a second message confirming the initiation (containing both tokens). This goes against
the design concept for SRUP to minimize the communications overhead, especially for devices with
poor-quality network connections.
Another commonly-adopted solution is to introduce an accurate time-stamp (this is an approach
used by Kerberos Network Authentication [10]); but this requires that all devices have access to a very
accurately synchronized time-signal (potentially very challenging when considering communications
via austere data networks).
A simpler solution that might be adopted in the context of SRUP would be to require each device
to keep a log of all of the tokens that they have received (restricted to only the tokens contained
within validly signed messages to prevent a brute force attack from overwhelming the storage) and to
require that the device check that any new token received does not match one that has been previously
received. SRUP uses a Boost Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) [11] for session tokens: 128 bits
in length and guaranteed to be unique for a given instance of the server. A receiving device would
therefore need to store (a potentially large number of) received tokens in persistent memory in order
to prevent the list from being reset by forcing the device to power-cycle.
This approach is not well suited to real-world use, as the storage overhead is potentially very
significant. Each token is 16 bytes, so even before considering any storage overhead, 512 tokens
would consume 8 kb of storage. For an embedded device without a file-system, this would potentially
require the use of an EEPROM module (such modules typically provide 64–512 kb: equivalent to just
4096–32,768 tokens).
3.1.2. A Sequence ID-Based Approach
The proposed method to address replay attack within SRUP is to use a sequence ID-based
approach: similar in concept to that used within the LoRaWAN protocol [12]. Adopting this method
would require an additional value (a sequence ID) within all SRUP messages. A 64-bit (eight byte)
sequence ID would be more than sufficient for this purpose (64 bits would permit a system using
1,000,000 messages a second to run for over 580,000 years before overflow). In order to conserve space
in the SRUP message, it might appear to be preferable to adopt a smaller size (e.g., a six byte sequence
ID, which would still permit 100,000 messages/second for 89 years). However, since a six-byte integer
is not a standard size, we would be required to implement our own six-byte integer type to handle
this value, and although this could be easily done in most languages, given that for even the smallest
message type, the difference would make a <1% difference to the overall message size, it is felt that
there is no value in doing this vs. using a standard 64-bit integer (e.g., uint64_t or unsigned long
long) for the sequence ID.
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The implementation would work in the same way for messages sent by the server and messages
sent by the devices. In all cases, the sender would simply store the last value it used to communicate
with that receiver, in local persistent storage, and increment it by one for each new message.
A typical device implementation would require that the device stores the last value that it has
received from that server, and the protocol would require that any message received from a given
server has a sequence ID greater than the last received sequence ID from that server. Any message
received where the sequence ID is less than or equal to a previously received sequence ID should
be discarded.
Since under the SRUP paradigm, devices can only accept messages from a server (the protocol
does not support peer-to-peer messaging), devices would be required to store (within persistent storage
such as a file system or EEPROM) just one such value for each server with which the device is in
communication. The relatively small size of the sequence ID means that even devices implemented
using tiny microcontroller-based hardware would be unlikely to face storage limitations. For example,
just one kilobyte of storage is more than sufficient for 128 sequence IDs at 64 bit (and it is expected that
128 different active C2 servers at any given time is likely significantly in excess of any requirement
from any real-world application).
On the server side, it can be assumed that storage will be much less of an issue. This approach
would require that a server keeps the last sequence ID from all devices that they have communicated
with (until such a time that the device has been removed from the system). Even a server with
100,000,000 devices would require less than 800 Mb of storage for the current sequence IDs; a relatively
trivial amount for any cloud-based server implementation.
The SRUP protocol has been updated to incorporate an eight-byte (64 bit) sequence ID value for
all message types; and to require that all received SRUP messages must be rejected if the sequence ID
is not strictly greater than the last received sequence ID from that sender.
3.2. Activate Confirmation
In the original protocol specification, no provision was made for a server to request confirmation
that a device had successfully received and acted upon the SRUP_ACTIVATE message; rather, it
was assumed that the server would be able to identify that the activation had occurred via other
(non-protocol) means. For completeness of the protocol, this capability has now been added.
Whilst this could be done by adding an additional message-type (for example a type such
as SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_ACTIVATE_RESPONSE), such a message-type would however have a structure
identical to the existing SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_RESPONSE; so a more elegant solution would be to use the
existing message-type, but to add two new responses to the previously defined statuses. This approach
has been adopted in the revised version of the protocol.
In keeping with other enhancements to the protocol, which seek to minimize the number of
different message types required, this approach helps to keep the protocol as simple as possible to
implement, whilst providing all of the functionality it requires.
3.3. Sender ID
In the original description of SRUP, it was assumed that there was no requirement to communicate
details of the sender of a given message, since the centralised nature of the protocol meant it would
always either correspond to a message from a server to a device, or from a device to a server.
The identity of the device would be contained within the MQTT topic that the message was sent
over; and it was assumed that a device receiving a message could safely assume that it came from
the server.
The paradigm of using the MQTT topic to convey the source/destination information means that
no additional data need be consumed in sending this as a part of the messages. However in the event
that multiple C2 servers are used simultaneously, there is no way for a device receiving a message to
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know which server has sent the message and, therefore, against which public key the signature should
be verified.
There are three potential solutions to this problem. The simplest is that the receiver should try
each of the keys it has in turn before concluding that the message cannot be verified. This is however
neither a scalable nor an elegant solution, and so, it can be rejected.
Another alternative is to further use the MQTT topic hierarchy to signify the sender. For
example, rather than subscribing to SRUP/dev0x01, the device and server(s) could subscribe to
SRUP/dev0x01/# (using the MQTT topic wildcard character #). This would then enable messages
from the device to use the higher level topic and for messages from different servers to use subtopics
(e.g., SRUP/dev0x01/sv0x2F) to indicate their origination. The topic field of the MQTT message could
then be parsed by the receiving device to extract the sender identity.
The third method is to include an additional field within the base SRUP message (i.e., the part that
is common to all messages, consisting of the header, sequence ID, signature and token) to contain the
sender ID. This method requires the smallest amount of work from the receiver to identify the client;
however, it also has the largest additional overhead on the message traffic. However, if we assume
that each device ID is a 128-bit UUID, then by requiring a sender ID field, we only expand the base
message from 282 bytes (2 bytes for the header, 16 bytes for the token, 8 bytes for the sequence ID and
256 bytes for the signature, assuming PKCS (Public-Key Cryptography Standards)#1 and a 2048-bit
key) to 298 bytes; approximately a 6% increase in size. Although not negligible, this may be considered
a preferable approach compared with the relative complexity of using the topic hierarchy-based
approach, and it is the method that has been selected.
3.4. Destination Addressing
Given the all-to-all nature of the MQTT publish/subscribe model, where all messages sent within
a specified topic are relayed to all subscribers; a system with multiple C2 servers subscribing to
a channel used for a specific device also has the problem of identifying to which of the potential
recipients a message is addressed. To a great extent, this is not an issue to be solved by the protocol, but
rather is a system implementation issue of managing complex C2 relationships. There are a number
of approaches that could be adopted by a C2 system to address the potential ambiguities of having
multiple C2 reporting lines; all well understood within the military domain (e.g., segregation by
message type, transfer of active command, a superior/subordinate hierarchical approach); or control
could simply be handed over from one server to another entirely, eliminating the situation where a
device was simultaneously connected to multiple C2 servers (or more formally, ensuring that only a
single C2 server was subscribed to a given device topic at any once time). In this context, the method
of using a sender ID is more than adequate.
One of the advantages of using the MQTTs publish/subscribe model is that messages can easily
be sent to more than one receiver at once. For example, a C2 server could establish a group of devices
(either by pre-arrangement or in the future, dynamically via a new SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_GROUP_ADD
message type). Such a group could then be used to pass instructions to all devices in that group with a
single C2 message. This too can be implemented without the requirement for destination addressing
beyond the use of the MQTT topic.
Whilst it is possible for the sender ID in the base message to be mirrored by the further addition
of a destination ID value (and noting that such an approach would be consistent with lower-level
networking protocols such as TCP), unlike lower-level protocols, this destination addressing is not
required for routing (at either a highly abstracted logical level or at the network transport layer level),
since the centralized MQTT broker and the publish/subscribe model take care of both of these for
us. Furthermore, because SRUP imposes a centralized C2 model, as previously discussed, there is no
scope for direct device-to-device messaging.
It should however be noted that to some extent, SRUP does use the concept of a destination
ID, as the update initiate message has a target ID field. This is the exception, however, since it
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forces a one-to-one mapping between devices and update initiation messages. There is a requirement
to be able to categorically ensure that the device-specific payload delivery can be maintained (a
requirement brought out in conversations with potential users of the protocol, in some military and
safety-critical applications).
3.5. Using SRUP for Application Data
There may be a number of circumstances in which an IoT device would wish to signal
application-specific data to a user in a secure and authenticated manner. For situations such as
these, the SRUP protocol could be used to carry signed application data messages from the device to
the C2 server for dissemination to the user.
The solution to this would be to create a new SRUP message-type (SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_DATA)
specifically designed to carry application data. This message type would consist of the following fields
(in addition to the base message fields):
• DATA_ID
A variable length string to indicate the data being sent in the message (e.g., “Sensor_A_Temp”,
etc.)
• DATA
A variable length byte stream. It is to be assumed that applications (i.e., both device and
server software) consuming SRUP are capable of determining the correct data-type to map
this byte-stream onto based on the value of DATA_ID. Applications will also be assumed to be
able to correctly handle byte-order issues within the application code.
• As each of these is a variable length field, the SRUP message will also need to specify the length
of these fields.
The specific meanings of the DATA and the DATA_ID are system and application specific and, hence,
can be used for any purpose by the application or system developer.
Given that the device originated messages used for application data increase the potential danger
of a replay attack, in order to prevent the sort of problems with a replay-attack described previously in
this document, it is especially important that the measures described elsewhere within this section be
adopted for these messages.
3.6. Using SRUP to Initiate Application-Specific Actions
In addition to SRUP data messages (Section 3.5), SRUP may be used to initiate application-specific
actions. A trivial example of this might be to use an action message to switch on or off a
connected peripheral.
This can easily be accomplished by adding a new message type (SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_ACTION),
which consists of the “base” message, plus an ACTION_ID field, which would take an application-specific
value to describe the action to be taken. Each action would be a simple atomic operation such as turning
a device on or off. As such, two different action IDs would be required to cover both halves of a binary
operation such as turning on and off.
The ACTION_ID is sent as a byte-stream so it could consist of a string or use a numeric value.
The recipient may optionally send a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_RESPONSE message to signal the outcome of
the action. Messages with an action ID value unknown to the recipient should be ignored; although the
recipient may optionally send a response message with a status value reflecting an unknown action.
For more complex actions where additional parametric data are required, a SRUP data message
(Section 3.5) can be used to send the appropriate data, before initiating the action.
Using this approach simplifies the action message and helps to reduce the volume of data being
sent. This way, additional data are only sent where they are required, as opposed to a model where
(for example) additional data are specified as a parameter to the action message.
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Whilst this message-type might be viewed as blurring the lines between system “management”
messages and “operational” messages, it is easy to imagine scenarios where the functionality for the
remote C2 server to securely pass such an operational message to the device might be highly desirable:
for example, activating an emergency beacon on the device. Rather than extending the core protocol
on the occasion that a custom message action is required or trying to specify a very large number of
such message types in the protocol specification, this approach means that anyone implementing a
system using SRUP will be able to easily use the protocol for these types of message. This is especially
important if the protocol is being used from a language other than C++. Although the examples
implemented thus far have been using C++ directly, it is ultimately desirable to provide wrappers to
the library so that it could be used natively from (for example) Python.
3.7. Additional HTTP Error Handling
Whilst the original version of the protocol provided only a means to signal that there had been an
error with the HTTP server when attempting to retrieve an update, an enhancement has been added
to provide the ability to send further details of the mode of failure (should these be required for a
given system or implementation). Rather than a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_RESPONSE status that just signals
an error, a further response-type has been added (SRUP_UPATE_FAIL_HTTP_ERROR) to signify that the
detail of the HTTP error will be encapsulated as two separate SRUP data messages containing the
HTTP status code and the contents of the server’s response.
3.8. MQTT Encryption
As described in the original paper, TLS-encrypted MQTT can be substituted for a plain-text
implementation of MQTT. For maximum security, this would be implemented using MQTT over
TLS, using the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) X.509 certificate authority approach
[13]. Whilst this would add an additional processing overhead (which may not be well suited for
very simple devices designed around very low-power microcontrollers), it is a means to provide full
end-to-end security of the connection between the device and the server for applications and systems
where this is required. With modern microcontrollers such as the Espressif ESP32 [14] now fully
supporting TLS, even low-power devices in the near-future would be able to fully utilize this approach.
4. Key Distribution
4.1. Background
Safe and secure mechanisms for key distribution are essential to ensure the integrity of any
messages protected by such keys. Asymmetric or public-key cryptography [15–17] goes some way
to addressing this by separating keys into a public and private portion. This simplifies the problem
into one of exchanging the non-secret public keys, requiring only that the integrity (and hence,
the trust-worthiness) of those keys is protected. Typically in implementation, an algorithm such as
RSA is used indirectly to encrypt a symmetric key that is used to encrypt the actual data; or to sign a
secure hash of the data, rather than the full data.
This is the approach taken within the Secure Remote Update Protocol, where messages are
protected by signing the SAH-256 hash value of the message, to provide assurance that the message has
not been tampered with in transit. Provided that the device has a copy of the server’s public key, it can
authenticate that any message it receives originated from that server. Similarly, any message from a
device can be authenticated by the server, using the copy of the device’s public key held by the server.
Whilst the asymmetric RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptographic algorithm is generally well
regarded as being secure [18] and is used to protect much secure Internet traffic via the use of Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) (now largely obsoleted due to security vulnerabilities [19]) or the more recent and
secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6], there is still some risk of compromise to a man-in-the-middle
attack during poorly-engineered key distribution.
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If a malicious third-party is able to intercept the key exchange messages, it would be possible for
that party to provide its own certificates in place of the genuine certificates in order to impersonate the
server to the device, and the device to the server.
Although such a party never has access to any of the private keys, it could still successfully
trick the device into thinking it is communicating with the genuine server: since without additional
measures such as key signing, the device would have no way to know that the public key retrieved
did not belong to the genuine server.
4.2. Identity and the Internet of Things
Consider an example IoT system using SRUP: consisting of an Internet-hosted C2 server and one
or more devices under the server’s control. In order to perform the initial registration of the device,
with the system, there are four pieces of information that need to be exchanged between the server
and the device.
1. The device needs to know the address of the MQTT broker being used to route messages.
2. The device also needs to know the server’s public key, in order to validate messages from
the server.
3. The server needs to know the device’s identity.
4. The server needs to know the public key corresponding to the device’s identity.
This device identity corresponds to a UUID generated using Boost [20]. Boost UUIDs are 128 bit
in length, yielding 2128 = 340× 1036 or more than enough to ever avoid collisions in any conceivable
system. Since SRUP uses cryptographic keys to assure the authenticity of messages, we can define
having a given identity as meaning that the device in question possesses the private key corresponding
to the public key associated with that identity’s UUID.
Depending on the specific implementation to be used, the device identity could be assigned
by the server (guaranteeing uniqueness for a given system), or it could be generated by the device
itself (although this must be validated by the server in order to ensure uniqueness within the system).
A randomly-generated 128-bit UUID is extremely unlikely to ever result in collision (hence the fact
that such values are used as an Universally Unique Identifier), but a check is required to prevent a
deliberate collision attack against the system.
4.3. Key Exchange via an HTTPS Secure Web Service
The proposed mechanism to conduct the initial registration process is to provide the device with
an Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTPS) URL (Uniform Resource Locator), which addresses
a website to be used to securely exchange the data. By using a TLS protected connection to the web
server, we secure the data in transit; and since TLS also provides proof of the identity of the web-server,
we are able to trust the exchange process. By using such a mechanism, we do not need to solve the
the key exchange problem within SRUP. TLS solves the problem of key exchange for the HTTPS
connection, by using the standard web-based key signing: ITU X.509 [13].
The concept of key signing is in essence very simple. Rather than a web server simply generating
its own (“self-signed”) key-pair, it instead has its keys signed by a trusted third-party known as
a Certificate Authority (CA); who signs the keys using their own trusted keys. The CAs keys are
themselves also signed by a superior intermediate CA, and so on, creating a chain of trust. Ultimately,
all such chains have at their source a root CA certificate; these root certificates confer trust on all
subordinate intermediate CA certificates. The public keys associated with these root CAs are (typically)
distributed as a part of the operating system or web browser application software and, hence, may be
assumed as being already present on the target device.
Since HTTPS over SSL/TLS provides this for us, there is no need to reimplement the process
within SRUP.
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To use this approach for the distribution of the server’s key, we simply need to add a suitable
certificate and a RESTful [21] HTTPS web service to the C2 server or wider system; and arrange
for this to provide, for example in a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format, the data that the
device requires.
4.4. Registration Workflow
The registration process can take place without any human interaction. The device connects to the
registration URL, and after communication has been established, it sends a POST request to send its
identity, its public key and any additional information that the specific system implementation requires
to know about the device. In return, the response from the server will contain the URL for the MQTT
broker and the server’s public key. The mechanism to store the server key and URL on the device will
naturally be device-specific (e.g., file-system, flash memory, Electrically-Erasable Programmable Read
Only Memory (EEPROM)); but on the server-side, it would be expected that this information would be
stored on a suitably protected private database.
Registration requests can be received from any device without prior arrangement. Simply having
registered a device on the system does not establish any specific relationship between that device and
any server; nor does it assign any trust to the device. As such, an attacker registering one or more
devices with the C2 server has very little impact on the operation of the system. The only reason
to consider filtering device registration requests might be in the event that an attacker attempts to
overwhelm the registration web-server by sending a large number of mendacious device requests in
order to achieve a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
Mitigation of this attack would be via modern good-practice implementation of web services:
to provide load-balancing to the server backend (both at the web-service layer and also the underlying
database mechanism used to store the identities). For a well-designed system, for example one exploiting
a micro-services-based architecture, even an effective DoS attack against the registration web-service
should not have any effect on the ability of the C2 server to continue to operate.
4.5. Communicating the Registration URL
Providing that we have physical access to the device, communicating the registration URL to the
device is very straightforward. It could be hard-coded into the device or we could manually enter the
URL in full or by using a public or private URL shortening service (assuming we trust such a service,
of course). We could also use a non-textual encoding of the URL, such as is used within the advertising
industry. For example, this could be in the form of a QR-code [22] or other two-dimensional bar-code;
or it could use radio-frequency communications via an Near-Field Communication (NFC) tag [23] or a
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [24] beacon protocol such as Eddystone [25].
For a system where it is not possible (or desirable) to have physical access to the device at the
time of registration, we would need to fall-back to the hard-coded approach of providing this initial
registration URL in the device’s software or firmware. This is clearly less desirable as an overall solution
since it constrains the device to only be usable in the context of one specific system; however, for many
systems, this may be considered a desirable feature to lock the device in the system in question.
Whatever the means of providing the URL, it is to be expected that in the majority of cases,
the registration process will take place before the device has been deployed. This means that despite
the potentially limited bandwidth available to the device in the field, the registration operation can be
assumed to occur without specific bandwidth constraints; and hence, the additional overheads of a
HTTP connection are not regarded as an issue.
The process also takes place entirely outside of the SRUP protocol.
Future Internet 2017, 9, 59 10 of 20
5. Proof of Identity
5.1. Joining a System
The registration operation is distinct from any subsequent request by the device to join and, thus,
becomes subordinate to a specific server and subject to control by that server. To perform such a join
operation, the device would initiate the process by sending a message containing its identity (and
any other parameters that might be required by a given system implementation) and a signature to
prove that the device is in possession of that identity. The server can then either accept the request as
is; or it can request that the device proves itself via an external observation. Once the server accepts
the request, it must then store the device identity in a suitable data structure cataloguing that server’s
subordinate devices.
Since identity is conferred by possession of the private key from the key-pair associated with that
identity, devices can prove their identity by using the fact that they can demonstrate that they have
this private key; for example, by decrypting a validation token encrypted with the public key.
An observer can be used to challenge a physical device to prove that it possesses the identity it is
claiming during the join process. This is accomplished by the C2 server (separately) supplying the
device and the observer with an encrypted value and requesting that the observer confirm that the
device presents the same value via the observation medium, as it has received via the protocol.
The mechanism of this presentation will depend on the specifics of the system and the nature
of the observer, but it could include displaying a human-readable representation of the value (for a
human observer); or using a secondary communications channel to transmit the value to the observer.
Such a multi-channel approach might be used in a system where devices in the form of autonomous
mobile platforms use a local channel to determine and/or signal their presence in a specific region.
5.2. Proposed SRUP Implementation
It is suggested that the mechanism described in Section 5.1, be implemented within a future
release of the SRUP protocol. Assuming that the registration process has already occurred
(externally to SRUP), a device wishing to become subject to control from a server would issue a
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_JOIN_REQ message to the server, which would consist of the device’s identity
and a signature to prove the authenticity of the origin. Depending on the system, the server could
either directly grant membership of its control-group to the device or require the device to provide
additional verification via observation. Note that since the device would not be part of an existing
SRUP network at the time of the join operation, the SRUP message would need to be sent over an
MQTT topic corresponding to the server’s ID: reserved specifically for join requests.
Whether or not this additional observation step will be required depends on the details of the
system being implemented. However, two specific use-cases can be identified, which are representative
of many likely real-world deployments of the SRUP protocol.
5.2.1. Human-In-The-Loop system
The first of these is a system with a human operator in the loop. This approach might be taken
when a trusted human operator is present with the device at the time of the join operation (as might be
the case for a sensor or other device being manually deployed).
In this class of system, the join operation is expected to be conducted with relation to a specific
(pre-known) device being deployed or installed. The device initiates the process by sending a
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_HM_JOIN_REQ message.
In response to this, the server would send a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_HM_JOIN_RESP message, which
would contain an encrypted value (a suitable randomly-selected 128-bit nonce value, encrypted
using the device’s public key). On receiving this message, the device would present the decrypted
version of that data for observation by a human observer. In this way, the trusted human observer,
in communication with the operator of the server (outside of the protocol) or who is operating the
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server themselves, would be able to compare the identity presented to the server and the identity
presented by the device being observed and deployed. This enables the operator of the server to be
assured that the physical device that was observed was the device that has the identity associated
with the join request. Depending on the device (and the nature of the system, as well as technical
proficiency of the operator), this presentation could be done in a number of different ways. In a simple
case, the device could display the decrypted value on a suitable display on the device.
A sequence diagram showing the information flow during a human-moderated join operation is
shown in Figure 1.
Other techniques for presenting a UUID in a human-readable form are explored in Section 8.
Figure 1. The sequence of a human-in-the-loop join operation.
5.2.2. Autonomous System
The second use-case is one where the device requesting the join is an autonomous entity and
so is operating without direct human intervention. In a system of this type, the join request could,
for example, be made as a part of the process for an autonomous device entering a specific region
of control.
The general pattern of operation in this more complex example would be for the server to generate
encrypted data in the same manner as before, but then request that another (already connected and
trusted) device make the observation check via a point-to-point connection outside of the protocol. For
example, if the autonomous platform making the join request recognises that it has entered into the
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region subject to C2 by the server by virtue of establishing a point-to-point connection with some kind
of beacon device, it could use the identity of this beacon as a part of its join request. The server could
then send the beacon a message containing the value that it should expect to receive from the device.
Once the joining device has received the server’s request for confirmation, it would then transmit the
confirmation data via the point-to-point link to the beacon, which would be responsible for checking
that the two values matched and signalling back to the server.
Under SRUP, this would be accomplished by having the device send an
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_OBS_JOIN_REQ message containing its own identity and the identity of
the observing node and signed with the requesting device’s key.
The server would then generate a 128-bit UUID value and an SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_OBSERVE_REQ
message to the observing node, which would contain an encrypted version of the value (encrypted
with the observing node’s public key) and a signature.
The server would also send a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_OBS_JOIN_RESP message back to the joining
device, using the same scheme, consisting of an encrypted version of the confirmation value, this time
using the joining node’s public key. The joining node would then be required to prove its identity to
the observing node outside of SRUP (for example, via a short-range point-to-point link); and then,
finally, the observing node would send a regular SRUP response message to the server, with a status
value to signal whether the proof of Identity has been successful or not.
Figure 2 shows a sequence diagram depicting the protocol message flows for an
externally-observed join; together with both a device-initiated and a server-initiated withdrawal
operation.
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Figure 2. A sequence diagram showing the message flows for autonomous join and withdrawal
operations. C2: command and control.
Future Internet 2017, 9, 59 14 of 20
6. Key Revocation
Key revocation is a vital, but often overlooked [26] aspect of any IoT system. It is however simple
to implement in the context of a C2 server-based approach to an IoT system. There are two types of
revocation that need to be considered.
1. The removal of a device as a subordinate to a C2 server such that it is no-longer subject to control
by that server, whilst retaining the device within the wider system (this is the opposite of a
join operation);
2. The permanent withdrawal of the device from the system as a whole (the opposite of initial
device registration).
To remove a device from a particular C2 network within SRUP, the device may elect to resign
(by sending a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_RESIGN_REQ message), or it may be terminated by the server (using
a SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_TERMINATE_COM message).
If the device is being disconnected by the server, the server would simply remove the record
pertaining to the device from its list of devices. If the device is requesting to resign, then the server
should send a response message with a status to indicate whether or not that resignation is accepted;
and (if it is) the key would be removed as before.
For a permanent (system-wide) de-registration of a device, SRUP could also be used
(despite the fact that the initial registration took place outside of the protocol). The data
exchange is essentially the same as for the resign/terminate use-case, but with message types of
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_DEREGISTER_REG, or SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_DEREGISTER_COM; the result of which
would be the device’s key being permanently removed from the system’s key store.
7. Potential Attack Mechanisms
In the event that an attacker is able to gain physical access to the device, it can be assumed that,
unless the device has been built to utilize encrypted storage and a trusted boot process [27], the attacker
would gain access to any data stored on the device. In the context of a SRUP device, most significantly,
this equates to the server’s public key and the device’s private key. Since the server’s public key is by
definition publicly available (on demand via the registration process, if nowhere else), we may largely
disregard this as being of use to an attacker. Having access to the device’s private key, however, means
by the definition used in Section 4.2 that the attacker may take the identity of the device. As such, any
messages that the system would permit the device to send could be spoofed and be sent by any other
device that the attacker may devise (and assign the original device’s identity to).
Although a system based on SRUP makes no attempt to provide a mechanism to monitor or detect
such identity theft, the centralized nature of the C2 server paradigm (with no peer-to-peer messaging)
means that the potential damage that can be caused by that identity theft may be contained to the
server. Other devices on the SRUP network cannot be directly affected. Given that by definition devices
are always subordinate to the server, there is limited scope for damaging the system via spoofing
device messages, beyond that which may be caused by directly interfering with the device’s sensors.
In the event that such an attack were detected, the device can be de-registered to revoke its ability to
communicate on the system.
Although such a device may be able to re-register and gain a new identity; in a human-moderated
system, it would not be able to join the server without the assistance of a compromised (but trusted by
the system) human (a situation that almost no security paradigm would be able to protect against).
Even in an automated or unmoderated system, being able to join (or retain) membership of a control
group is, as previously discussed, of very limited value to an attacker.
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The greatest threat to any centralized C2 system is the compromise of the centre; however, the
asymmetric cryptographic approach adopted by SRUP means that compromise of a subordinate node
has no impact on the security of the central server.
The greatest threat to the system is if an attacker were to compromise a beacon node; as in this
eventuality, the attacker would be able to spoof any observation check conducted using that beacon.
Although protection against physical tampering is beyond the scope of SRUP, it should be noted that
protecting an observer node from physical compromise is critical to the overall security of any system
utilizing such devices.
8. Methods for Easy Human Comparison of UUID Values
For a system reliant on a human comparison, there are a number of ways that a 128-bit number
could be presented. Conventionally, such numbers are shown as a string representation of a 32-digit
hexadecimal value. Where such values are generated as true UUIDs, they are typically presented using
the 8-4-4-4-12 format described in [28]. Given the visual clarity of this format, it is desirable to adopt
the same approach to presenting the 16 bytes of any 128-bit value. An example of a 128-bit UUID used
by the protocol formatted in this manner can be seen in Figure 3.
C4BF8105-8351-41E0-886F-D25F9A69C5AD
Figure 3. An example of a 36-character string depicting a 128-bit binary value in standard
hexadecimal notation.
Such an option is the simplest method to implement: a small 16× 2 character, text-mode Liquid
Crystal Display (LCD) suitable for displaying such a value (without hyphenation) would likely add
only around $3–4 to the bill-of-materials cost for a device; and such an approach would be technically
compatible with even the most basic microcontroller.
Requiring the careful comparison of two 32-character hexadecimal values is, however, not an
especially user-friendly interface and is really only well suited to environments with specialist users.
Instead, other options could be adopted to present the value for comparison. Crucially, it is not
important that the observer be able to identify the underlying value presented to them; but rather only
to recognise whether two examples presented match or differ from each other.
8.1. Pictographic Representation
One way to do this might be to present the 128-bit value in the form of a human-readable
pictograph consisting of a 12× 12 grid of 144 monochromatic cells. Since this gives us 16 cells too
many for a 128-bit value, we would need to use 16 additional ‘bits’ of fixed padding; for example, by
placing a 2 × 2 block in each corner. Such a pictograph would have an appearance something similar
to that of a 2D barcode: although one that is designed for human recognition, rather than machine
readability. Whilst a specific scheme for encoding such a UUID into a monochrome pictograph has not
been proposed, an example of the appearance of such a pictograph is shown in Figure 4 to contrast
with the other representational approaches discussed.
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Figure 4. An example black and white, 12 × 12 grid depicting a 128-bit binary value; in which the
colour of each cell corresponds to the value of individual bits within the value.
The value could also be presented in the form of a smaller 8× 8 grid of cells, coloured with one of
four colours. With careful selection of the colours, it is possible to produce a grid with a sufficient visual
difference to be easily distinguished; and avoiding combinations that were indistinct for those with
various forms of colour-blindness. Again, whilst a specific protocol for such encoding has not been
devised as a part of this work, an example of one such method (where the content of each square in the
pictograph is determined by the value of two-bits in the UUID) is shown in Figure 5, for comparison
with the other approaches described.
Figure 5. An example four-colour, 8 × 8 grid depicting a 128-bit binary value; in which the colour of
each cell corresponds to the the value of two-bits in the value.
For a device with a graphical screen capable of rendering such a pictograph (or which has the
necessary hardware to permit its connection to an external display for the purposes of validating the
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join operation), an image of one of these two types could be displayed by the device and also presented
in the user-interface to the server (e.g., a web page) after the registration process had been initiated.
For devices without a suitable screen, the device could utilize a BLE connection to a smart-phone
or tablet running simple application software, which could be used to display the verification code
pictogram. Although this is potentially less secure as it increases the attack surface, by adding an
additional communications channel that could be targeted by an attacker, the short-range nature of
BLE and the time sensitivity of the join operation process mean that in practice, this would be fairly
low risk in a real-world application of such a system.
8.2. Word-List Representation
An alternative to a graphical depiction of the value would be to present the value in the form of a
“phrase” generated from words taken from a standard word-list; with the multiple parts of the 128-bit
value mapped onto individual words from the list.
Such approaches have been shown before (for example, [29]) for presenting cryptographic keys to
users, but can easily also be applied to the presentation of identity.
For example, we can divide a 128-bit value into ten, 12-bit fragments: with each 12-bit fragment
being mapped on to one of a list of 212(4096) different English-language words, drawn from a suitably
distinctive word-list. A suitable world-list would be one designed for use as a means of providing
users a mechanism to generate high entropy passwords [30]. The remaining eight bits of the original
128-bit value could then be represented either by one of 256 additional words; or by using words from
within the same list (and using the previously described technique of padding the value with four
additional ‘fixed’ bits). Thus, the user would be presented with a “phrase” for comparison to assure
identity during the join operation.
An example of using words selected from such a word-list to generate an identity-phrase can be
seen in Figure 6.
aggregate diffuser straw zeppelin exponent ungraded problem flail dust postbox elf
Figure 6. An example of an identity phrase generated using a word-list.
The options for presentation of this phrase to the user are similar to those for the presentation
of both pictographs and the text strings, although clearly, a screen suitable to display simple textual
information is very-much simpler than that which might be required to render a coloured pictograph.
9. Results and Future Work
9.1. Results
An initial protocol test-bed was constructed, and an example showing the use of an update
message was demonstrated at the 2016 3rd IEEE World Forum on the Internet of Things. This
implementation consisted of an IoT C2 system: using the Mosquitto broker; a Raspberry Pi 3 as an
example device, alongside an example device-side daemon; and a C2 server. Both the daemon and
server were implemented using the SRUP library, C++ components and Python scripts, with the
interprocess communication handled using Apache Thrift [31]. Although not formally measured,
the performance of this system was more than adequate. A short video demonstrating the update
messages and the C2 interface was produced. [32]
A packet capture showed that the most complex message-type measured (an update initiate
message) consisted of 424 bytes of SRUP data (consisting of a 33-byte URL, a 64-byte SHA-256 digest
and an 8-byte target; plus the message signature, transaction token and other protocol overheads), sent
as 493 bytes of MQTT traffic. Even this message type (the most complex, consisting of more fields than
any other message type) could easily be delivered over even an unreliable or slow Internet connection.
The adoption of MQTT QoS 1 (to provide guaranteed delivery of the message) adds an additional
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MQTT PUBACK message (consisting of just 60 bytes total, when using Internet Protocol Version 4
(IPv4)).
The cryptographic functions used to support the SRUP protocol are also highly efficient in terms
of performance, even on relatively low-power hardware. The implementation tested thus far, on a
Raspberry Pi 3 and using OpenSSL to provide both the SHA-256 digests and the RSA signatures, was
more than adequately executed. In a test case, signing and verifying a representative SRUP initiate
message, using a Raspberry Pi 3 and averaged over five runs, signing took an average of 56.68 ms, and
verifying the signature took just 9.91 ms.
Work continues to provide a complete reference implementation of the SRUP protocol,
as described in this paper, in the form of a C++ library.
9.2. Planned Future Work
Once the implementation of all features of the SRUP protocol is complete, a series of experiments is
planned to provide an objective measurement of the protocol in action, measuring both the performance
and scalability of the protocol as representative of real-world C2 applications.
10. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how the SRUP protocol can be extended through the introduction
of additional message-types, to be used as a general-purpose protocol for authenticated IoT
communications. We have also proposed some methods that could be utilized to provide a means for
physical devices to prove they have an identity corresponding to a logical device within the network,
using either human- or a machine-in-the loop methods.
Full details of all the message types within the SRUP protocol may be found in the protocol
specification document [33].
The source code for the latest version of the library and an example implementation of the
device-side daemon, as well as C2 server are all released under the terms of the MIT open licence.
The latest version can be found at: https://github.com/dstl/SRUP/.
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